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Summary: Previous crashing memory studies have shown that adults can be led to believe they witnessed video footage of news
events for which no video footage actually exists. The current study is the first to investigate adults’ tendency to report memories of
viewing footage that took place when they were children: the plane crash in Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001. We found that in
a computer questionnaire, 33% indicated a false memory with at least one false detail. In a more detailed face-to-face interview,
only 13% of the group described a detailed false memory. Familiarity with the news story, fantasy proneness, alcohol use, and
frequency of negative emotions after 9/11 were all associated with a Persistent False Memory. Participants who had received
prior suggestion were more likely to later report false memories in the subsequent interview. We discuss our novel results and
the importance of the paradigm. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Memory distortion research has important applications in
real-life cases in the law, clinical psychology, and other
areas. Some of these real-life cases have involved the distor-
tion of memory in children, in adults for recent events, and in
adults for events in their childhood. To investigate both
applied and theoretical issues related to such real-life phe-
nomena, researchers have developed a number of memory
distortion paradigms, including the misinformation effect
(Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), associative word lists
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995), rich false memory (Loftus
& Pickrell, 1995), and imagination inflation (Garry,
Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). One paradigm, the
‘crashing memory’ technique (Crombag, Wagenaar, & van
Koppen, 1996), involves asking participants if they have
seen footage for a widely reported news event, often invol-
ving a crash (hence the name), when in fact no video footage
of the event really exists. In response to such questions,
many participants in these studies appeared to develop false
beliefs and memories that they witnessed events they could
not possibly have seen.
The crashing memory paradigm has several advantages
that represented an important alternative way to measure
memory distortion. The first advantage is that the event
involved a nationally important news story that was usually
personally important to the participants, thus allowing for
the measurement of an upsetting memory that can be auto-
biographical in nature. The second advantage is the national
news event in question is somewhat of a collective experi-
ence across participants, and thus, their memory reports are
comparable across subjects. This is often not true in other
studies where people are asked about their upsetting or
traumatic memories, and different participants point to
completely different types of events in their lives. The third
advantage is that the researcher can be reasonably confident
that the event (viewing disturbing footage in this case) did
not take place. This certainty about the falsity of the memory
is not always present in other autobiographical false memory
research (e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Garry et al., 1996).
Despite these advantages, previous crashing memory studies
have focused on events that happened when the participants
were adults. In the present study, we explore the phenome-
non by asking adults about an event that occurred in their
childhood. We also investigate a number of other factors that
have not previously been examined in crashing memory
studies, such as the effect of prior suggestion.
Previous crashing memory studies
In the first crashing memory study, Crombag et al. (1996)
told Dutch participants there was videotape of a widely
reported Boeing 747 crash into apartments in Amsterdam.
Although the actual plane crash had not been filmed, a
remarkable 55% in Study 1 and 66% in Study 2 of the parti-
cipants reported seeing the footage and about 45% reported
details of its contents. A follow-up study demonstrated a
similar phenomenon for a nationally important car crash.
Ost, Vrij, Costall, and Bull (2002) asked participants if they
had seen footage of the car crash in which Princess Diana
was killed (when in fact none exists), and 44% of the sample
reported they had.
The studies that followed reinforced these surprisingly
large percentages with different target news events and also
showed that social influence could boost false memory rates.
For example, Granhag, Stromwall, and Billings (2003)
found that 55% of respondents reported that they saw nonex-
istent footage of a well-known incident involving a sinking
ferry and found that about 30% gave a false detail, suggest-
ing that the false beliefs may have been accompanied by
memories. The results also showed that misleading com-
ments from peers, when overheard by the participant, can
boost false memory rates (see also Ost, Hogbin, & Granhag,
2006 for a replication using a different target news event).
Similarly, Wilson and French (2006) asked participants to
recall the details of a bombing that had occurred in a Bali
nightclub, and 36% of participants reported seeing nonexis-
tent footage, with nearly all of them reporting corresponding
memories for details they could not have seen.
These studies raised the question whether these false
memory reports were being caused by the suggestion or
whether they were spontaneously generated. An interesting
experimental approach by Smeets et al. (2006) found that
the level of suggestiveness in the crashing memory questions
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affected the rates at which participants reported seeing non-
existent news footage of the assassination of Dutch politician
Pim Fortuyn (a famous figure well known to the Dutch par-
ticipants). Interestingly, even with no suggestion (‘Do you
remember whether there was a film…’; notice the indefinite
article ‘a’), 27% of participants indicated they had seen the
footage of the assassination, although only 6% reported
actual false details. With false suggestion (‘Did you see the
amateur film of the Fortuyn shooting?’; notice the definitive
article ‘the’), the false reports were much higher: 63% with
33% giving false details. These results demonstrate not only
the importance of suggestive wording but also that false
memories can occur even in the absence of misleading
post-event information (spontaneously; cf. Mazzoni, 2002).
Further research established the importance of familiarity
of the news event to the participant. Ost, Granhag, Udell,
and Hjelmsäter (2008) asked participants, 150 from Sweden
and 150 from the UK to complete questionnaires about the
explosion of the number 30 bus in Tavistock Square,
London. UK participants were more likely to say they had
seen nonexistent computer-generated image of the explo-
sion, and nonexistent television footage of the explosion,
compared with the Swedish participants (40% vs. 16%). This
indicated that perhaps familiarity with the event, or indeed
the amount of exposure to the original news reports, might
facilitate the implanting of such memories.
A study by Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, and Merckelbach
(2009) perhaps created doubts about how many of the false
memory reports in previous crashing memory studies were
in fact valid false memories that would persist. In keeping
with a number of past studies, they found high rates of false
report of seeing nonexistent footage (66%) following the
suggestion that there is footage of the assassination of Pim
Fortuyn. However, after the debriefing, in which they were
informed that there is no footage of the actual moment of
the assassination, most claimed they had not fully under-
stood the question, with only 10% maintaining that they
had truly remembered the footage during the experiment.
This decrease in false memory percentages in a crashing
memory study raised questions whether previous studies
could have had inflated percentages and also what in partic-
ular could have caused the reduction in percentages. In
Smeets et al., it is unclear whether the true post-event infor-
mation (i.e., ‘there is no footage’) caused the decrease in
false memory reports or whether the open-ended and more
detailed, clear, and cautious approach of the post-debriefing
interview caused the decrease. Ost et al. (2008) and Smeets
et al. (2009) raised the issue of whether the suggestive ques-
tion in crashing memory studies simply brings out a pre-
existing false memory (spontaneous; formed before the
study, perhaps by exposure to successive media reports) or
the suggestion in the experiments causes the false memory
production (suggestion-dependent; cf. Mazzoni, 2002).
Individual differences and crashing false memory
Some previous research has been carried out investigating
individual differences and crashing memories. In some stud-
ies, women were more prone to false report (Crombag et al.,
1996; Jelicic, Smeets, Candel, van Suijdam, & Merckelbach,
2006a; Jelicic et al., 2006b) but not in other studies
(Ost et al., 2002; Ost et al., 2006; Granhag et al., 2003;
Smeets et al., 2009). With regard to personality-related mea-
sures, Ost et al. (2008) found that those scoring high on dis-
sociation (Dissociative Experiences Scale, DES-C; Wright &
Loftus, 1999) or fantasy proneness (Creative Experiences
Questionnaire; Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001)
were more likely to give definitive details of nonexistent
footage (of the bus moving in the London bus bombings).
These measures relate to an ongoing debate as to whether
the most prone people who develop false memories are those
that are highly hypnotizable (related to fantasy proneness), a
question that has historical roots in false memory production
in hypnosis (see Patihis & Younes Burton, in press). The
question of whether dissociation is related to false memories
is routed on an ongoing debate about the relationship, if any,
between dissociation and memory (e.g., Lynn et al., 2014).
Another area of interest is the possibility that participants’
tendency towards social desirability might explain the
unusually high frequency of false memory reports in previ-
ous crashing memory research (cf. McCloskey & Zaragoza,
1985). And finally, an individual difference that may also
affect memory is alcohol consumption, which has shown
promise as a factor in other areas of memory distortion
research (e.g., Garfinkel, Dienes, & Duka, 2006), but there
is a scarcity of data addressing alcohol in crashing memory
studies. In the current study, we investigate the role of these
variables and others.
The current study
Although previous research seemed to establish a strong
effect of suggestion on memory of nonexistent footage,
Smeets et al. (2009) raised the question as to how many of
these are genuine and indeed persistent false memories. They
also discussed an apparent reduction in false memories and
the reasons for it. A key question raised by this was whether
false memories in crashing memory studies were spontane-
ously produced by prior exposure to media or whether they
were caused by the suggestion in the actual experiments.
The current study explores these issues. Previous crashing
memory studies have also not examined events that took
place in the childhood of the participants. The current study
does this to gain an insight to the real-life parallel of false
memories induced into adults for upsetting childhood events.
We also investigate a number of possible correlates of these




The participants were 297 undergraduates (221 females and 78
males) who participated in the study in exchange for course
credit. Of these, 48.8% are self-identified as Asian/Indian,
21.5% as Caucasian, 16.2% as Hispanic/Latino, 7.4% as
Middle Eastern, 3.4% as Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 2.0% as
African-American/Black, and 0.7% other. Participants’ mean
age was 20.1 years (SD = 3.1). The majority of our partici-
pants (n = 271) were between 18 and 22 so that they were
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between the ages of 8 and 12 years at the time of the event.
For purposes of comparison, there were also a small number
(n = 26) of older participants, between ages 23 and 51 years.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions1 : an experimental condition (in which they completed
a computer questionnaire containing suggestive information
about the target event) or a control condition (in which they
completed a computer questionnaire about an unrelated event).
Approximately 40minutes after the questionnaires, all partici-
pants underwent a face-to-face interview in which they were
asked about their memories of the target event. See Figure 1
for a graphical representation of the study design.
Materials and procedure
Participants were invited to participate in a study ostensibly
about ‘Personality, Individuality, and Slideshows’. All sub-
jects participated in 2011, between March and November,
approximately 10 years after 9/11. Participants came into
the laboratory one at a time, staggered one every
15–20minutes, and were greeted by a research assistant
who gave them verbal instructions to prepare them for the
study. Between one and three participants participated in a
computer laboratory room at any given time, with one or
two research assistants supervising. The lab room was
windowless and mostly silent. The research assistants who
interacted with the participants and conducted the interview
were blind to both the assigned condition of participants
and the precise hypotheses of the study.
Session 1
Once randomly assigned to condition, the participant
proceeded to fill out the computer questionnaires. They
first answered demographic questions. Other measures
asked about memory for their negative emotions in the
week following 11 September 2001. In addition to those
questions, participants also completed a number of measures,
including an alcohol-use scale (modified from LaBrie,
Hummer, Grant, & Lac, 2010), the Creative Experiences
Questionnaire (fantasy proneness; Merckelbach, Muris, &
Rassin, 1999; Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001),
and the DES-C (Wright & Loftus, 1999). Session 1 typically
took participants about 35minutes to complete.
Session 2
Exactly 1week after Session 1, the subjects returned to the
lab for Session 2. As in Session 1, a research assistant gave
verbal instructions and then helped the participant start on
the computer questionnaire.
Crashing memory questionnaire
Depending on which condition they were assigned to, parti-
cipants either completed a news story questionnaire asking
about their memory for United 93 crash footage (experi-
mental condition), or the Human Genome news event
(control group). Each questionnaire was similar in construc-
tion and length and differed only in the memory recall target
(i.e., the targets were United 93 crash footage, versus the
Human Genome news event). See the Supporting Informa-
tion for the crashing memory materials used in the computer
questionnaire.
United 93 condition
In this condition, participants were told that footage of the
crash exists and has been widely shown and were then asked
whether they had seen the footage. They were then asked to
indicate details of the footage, which involved force choice
questions involving false details, including an option of ‘I
don’t remember’. For example, one question asked about
the participants’ memory of the video footage and gave the
choices that the plane (a) ‘came down vertically, nose down
and almost without forward speed’, (b) ‘slid into the ground
almost horizontally and at considerable speed’, or (c) ‘I can’t
remember’. Another question gave the participants the
choice that the video footage was (a) ‘very clear, you can
see and hear exactly what is happening’, (b) ‘fuzzy, it is
difficult to tell what is happening’, or (c) ‘I can’t remember’.
1 In order to keep the current analysis focused and clear, 96 participants who
were randomly assigned to a third condition are not analyzed in the current
study because by design they did not participate in the interview (Patihis,
2012). The random assignment was set up on the computer to place one-half
of participants into the experimental condition and one-quarter into each of
the two control conditions, resulting in 202 in the experimental condition
and 95 in the human genome control condition in the main article.
Figure 1. A simplified representation of the study design
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For the full wording of the questionnaires, see Supporting
Information. Participants then proceeded to fill out a
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ, modified from
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988 to include an I don’t
remember option, scored as 0) about their memory for the
footage. This condition acted as the experimental condition,
simulating the crashing memory manipulations of previous
studies.
Control condition
In this condition, neither United 93 nor 11 September 2001
was mentioned at all. Instead, participants were asked a
similar set of questions about their memory for the Human
Genome news event (as opposed to footage) that was
reported in 2001. This condition acted as a control condition
that not only had no suggestion of nonexistent footage, but
also did not stimulate any imagery of United 93 or 9/11.
These two conditions allowed us to measure the effect of
prior misleading suggestion on the interview, which occurred
approximately 40minutes later.
Fillers
Subjects completed a number of filler tasks that for reasons
of clarity and focus are not analyzed in the current study.
Participants also completed a 91-item personality scale
designed to measure a total of 13 personality subscales
(Swedish Universities Scale of Personality; Gustavsson
et al., 2000). These trait subscales include somatic trait
anxiety, psychic trait anxiety, stress susceptibility, lack of as-
sertiveness, impulsiveness, adventure seeking, detachment,
social desirability, embitterment, trait irritability, mistrust,
verbal trait aggression, and physical trait aggression. The
social desirability scale, in particular, was used to investigate
the participants’ wish to help the researchers (i.e., demand
characteristics) as a possible confound. In addition, research
assistants who conducted the interviews also completed this
personality scale as well as demographic questions (for
reasons of space and clarity, the results for interviewer
characteristics are mentioned only briefly in the main article,
and in more detail in the Supporting Information).
United 93 crash footage interviews
In this audio-recorded structured interview, participants were
taken away from the other participants into a quiet room. In a
one-on-one and face-to-face conversation with the research
assistant, participants were told about the various crashes
on 9/11, then told that we are focusing here only on United
93, and asked ‘Are you familiar with this event?’ (open re-
sponse). The participants are then told that there is footage
for the crash of United 93, and then asked ‘Do you remember
seeing that footage?’ (open response). No such footage actu-
ally exists. In this interview, we took pains to be clear about
what crash we were referring to and reiterated it was a crash
into a field. See Supporting Information for the interview
script. In the interview, those participants who said ‘yes’,
they had seen the footage were then asked follow-up ques-
tions about details. After the interview was complete, we re-
vealed that the study was actually about memory distortions
and that there is no footage of the United 93 crash. The typ-
ical duration of Session 2 was between 60 and 75minutes.
Quantitative coding of interview responses
All interviews were coded by two independent coders
(research assistants), and any inter-rater disagreements were
scrutinized carefully and resolved by a supervising
researcher in discussion with one or both research assistants.
The question asking about whether the participant was fami-
liar with United 93 was coded as 0 = no, 0.5 = unsure/
maybe, and 1 = yes, and the initial inter-rater agreement rate
was 78% (66 disagreements out of 297; Cronbach α = .839).
Whether someone was familiar with the United 93 news
event was not always easy to code, because sometimes
participants would start out by saying ‘a bit’ but then go on
to give details to demonstrate that they were fully familiar.
These difficult-to-code cases were carefully recoded when-
ever research assistants’ initial coding did not match. The
questions asking whether they had seen the footage were
coded in a similar manner (no = 0; maybe/unsure = 0.5;
yes = 1), and the initial inter-rater agreement rates on those
questions were 93% and 92%, respectively (Cronbach α =
.955 and .935). The question asking how well the parti-
cipants remember the video on a scale from 1 to 10 was
straightforward to code, and the inter-rater agreement rate
was 99% (Cronbach α = .996). Interviews that included a
‘yes’ response and a memory score of more than 2 on the
1–10 Likert scale were coded for false details of the actual
crash by a supervising researcher (L. P.). All of these 43
cases examined had the coding justified by transcribing the
relevant part of the interview text (performed by a research
assistant or the supervising researcher) and considering whether
the actual content of the detail must be false (i.e., movement of
the plane or the actual impact/explosion was coded as a false
detail, whereas pictures or video of the aftermath were not
assumed to be false). Details from any of the other crashes on
9/11 (e.g., a crash into a building) were not coded as a false
detail.
Results
In the results that follow, we examine the rates of false mem-
ory in the questionnaire and then the interview. We then ex-
amine the association between false memory and familiarity
with the news story, prior suggestion, ethnicity, alcohol use,
emotion, and fantasy proneness. Finally, we take a specific
look at those participants who were between the ages of 8
and 12 years at the time of the target event (9/11).
Computer questionnaire
Of the 297 participants completing the study, 95 were
assigned to the Human Genome control no-suggestion ques-
tionnaire,2 and 202 were assigned to the crash footage ques-
tionnaire (for an explanation of the unequal group sizes, see
Footnote 1). Of the 202 participants assigned to the United
93 crash footage condition, when asked ‘have you seen the
video?’, 36.6% indicated ‘yes’, they had seen the United
93 crash footage. Of the 36.6% who indicated ‘yes’, they
had seen the footage, 91.8% gave at least one false detail
2 By definition, the Human Genome condition (n = 95) reveals nothing re-
lated to false memories at the questionnaire stage; hence, you only see those
participants in the analysis of the interview that came 40minutes later.
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(how the plane moved, clarity of footage, or length of foot-
age). Specifically, of those 36.6% who said ‘yes’, 62.2%
gave a detail about the plane moving, 60.8% gave a detail
about after the impact, 68.9% gave some detail about the
clarity of the footage, and 51.4% gave a detail about the
length of the footage (see Supporting Information for ques-
tion wording on the four detail questions). Of all the 202 par-
ticipants, 41.1% gave some false detail of the nonexistent
plane crash footage (therefore, a minority of 4.5% partici-
pants initially indicated they had not seen the footage but
consequently chose a false detail in the follow-up questions).
Of the 202 participants in the group that received false
suggestion (the crash footage condition), when asked ‘how
well can you remember having seen the video?’, 59.4% indi-
cated 1 (no memory at all) on the scale from 1 to 10, and
40.3% indicated a 2 or above. A score of 5 or above was in-
dicated by 9.9% of the participants, with one participant
(0.5%) indicating 10 (a very clear memory). Of those 73 that
had indicated ‘yes’, they had seen the footage, all (73; 100%)
indicated a score of 2 or above on this scale, with 26% (19)
indicating a score of 5 or above. In contrast, of the 128 who
indicated ‘no’, they had not seen the video, 93.8% (120)
indicated a score of 1 (no memory at all) on this 1–10 scale.
False belief versus false memory
We classified subjects as having a Questionnaire False
Memory if all three of the following conditions were met:
they indicated ‘yes’, they had seen the footage, indicated a
score of 2 or above on the aforementioned 1–10 scale, and
chose at least one false detail. A false belief involved choosing
‘yes’, they had seen the footage, but either choosing 1 (no
memory at all) on the 1–10 scale or indicating no false details
in the follow-up questions. Using this criteria, 67 (33.2%) of
the 202 participants indicated a Questionnaire False Memory,
7 (3.5%) indicated a false belief, and 128 (63.4%) reported no
false belief or memory.
Audio-recorded interview
About 40minutes after the computer questionnaire, those in
the United 93 crash footage (experimental, n = 202) condi-
tion, and the Human Genome (control, n = 95) condition
participated in the face-to-face recorded interview with a
research assistant. Of the 297 participants who participated
in the crashing memory interview, 48 (16.2%) said they
had seen the footage, 23 (7.7%) said unsure/maybe, and
226 (76.1%) said they had not seen the crash footage of
United 93. This figure of 16.2% saying ‘yes’ in the interview
compares with the 36.6% that indicated ‘yes’ in the forced-
choice computer questionnaire earlier. In the interview,
when asked how well they remembered having seen the
video on a scale from 1 to 10, 37.0% (110 out of 297) indi-
cated 1 (no memory at all) on the scale from 1 to 10, 63.0%
indicated a 2 or above, and 15.8% indicated a score of 5 or
above, with one participant (0.3%) indicating 10 (a very
clear memory).
False memory versus false belief
Similarly to the questionnaire, we categorized participants as
having an Interview False Memory when all the following
three conditions were met in the interview: the participants
says ‘yes’, they have seen the video, they give a score of 2
or above on the aforementioned 1–10 scale and they give
some false detail from the footage connected to the actual
crash (most commonly being how the plane moved or
crashed in the footage). A false belief involves the partici-
pants saying ‘yes’, they had seen the footage, but then either
choosing 1 (no memory at all) on the 1–10 scale or giving no
false details of the actual crash in the footage. Using these
criteria, we identified 30 (10.1%) as having an Interview
False Memory, 18 (6.1%) having a false belief, and 249
(83.8%) showing neither.
Comparing experimental to control group
Effect of prior suggestion on Interview False Memory
Some subjects who participated in the audio-recorded in-
terview had responded to a suggestive questionnaire about
United 93 on the computer 40minutes earlier (experimen-
tal condition), while others had been randomly assigned
to a non-suggestive neutral questionnaire about the 2001
Human Genome news story (control condition). Figure 2
shows that a higher proportion of those in the experimental
condition exhibited Interview False Memories (13.4%; 27
of 202) compared with those in the control condition
(3.2%, 3 of 95), χ2 (1, N = 297) = 7.42, exact p = .006,
Cramer’s V = 0.158. This four-fold difference in false
memory proportions in the interview shows the potent
effect of the suggestive questionnaire 40minutes earlier.
Effect of prior suggestion on quality of interview false
memories
Within those who demonstrated an Interview False Memory,
we examined whether there is a difference in memory quality
between those who had prior suggestion 40minutes earlier
(n = 27) and those who had not (n = 3). We found that those
Figure 2. Percentages of participants by experimental condition
who demonstrated a detailed Interview False Memory
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with prior suggestion scored marginally higher on the ques-
tion ‘how well can you remember having seen the video on
a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means no memory at all and
10 means a very clear memory’ (no prior suggestion: M =
2.33, SD = 0.58; prior suggestion: M = 4.09, SD =
1.48), t(28) = 2.01, p = .054, Cohen’s d = 1.57. Levene’s
test for equality of variances had a p-value of .15 (F =
2.24) indicating that assumption of equality of variance is
not strictly violated. However, the low Levene’s test
p-value and the small group size warrant reporting the equal
variances not assumed test: comparing prior suggestion with
no prior suggestion on subsequent false memory clarity in the
interview yielded t(5.76) = 4.01, p = .008.
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and Interview False
Memories
Forty minutes before the interview, those 202 participants in
the experimental condition answered MCQ items relating to
the United 93 footage. Most of the items on the MCQ
associated with the occurrence of an Interview False
Memory (rs from .13 to .41; see Supporting Information
Table S1 for each MCQ item and effect sizes). The largest
MCQ predictor of Persistent False Memory was item 10
‘Feelings at the time that I first saw the video were’ (anchors:
1 = not intense, 7 = very intense), r = .41, p < .001. In other
words, self-reported memory of more intense feelings was
associated with a greater likelihood of reporting a detailed
false memory in the interview.
Persistent False Memory
We defined a Persistent False Memory as having occurred
when a participant met the three criteria for a Questionnaire
False Memory and the three criteria for an Interview False
Memory. By this metric, 25 (12.4%) participants exhibited
a Persistent False Memory, out of the 202 who participated
in both the suggestive questionnaire and interview. To clarify
apparent differences in percentages, this Persistent False
Memory figure of 12% is by definition from within the expe-
rimental group only, whereas the aforementioned 10% Inter-
view False Memory is from the whole sample (some of whom
did not receive the prior suggestive questionnaire).
Comparing those familiar to those not familiar with the
news story
Although all participants were familiar with the 9/11 general
news story, only 142 (70.3%) of the 202 in the experimental
condition were somewhat familiar with the United 93 story
(responses to question ‘are you familiar with this event?’
coded .5 =maybe, n = 20; or 1 = yes, n = 122). In the question-
naire, the 142 participants rated as being familiar with the
United 93 news story, compared with those 60 not familiar
(coded 0 = no), were marginally more likely to indicate a
Questionnaire False Memory (37.3% vs. 23.3%; χ2 (1, N =
202) = 6.50, p = .054, exact p = .072 (all ps two-tailed
throughout), Cramer’s V = 0.136). In the interview, those
somewhat familiar with the United 93 news story, compared
with those not familiar, were more likely to indicate an Inter-
view False Memory (19% vs. 0.0%; χ2 (1, N = 202) = 13.2,
exact p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.255). Similarly, those
somewhat familiar with the United 93 news story, compared
with those not familiar, were more likely to indicate a
Persistent False Memory throughout the questionnaire and
interview (17.6% vs. 0.0%; χ2 (1, N = 202) = 12.06, exact
p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.244).
Media exposure on 9/11
A bivariate logistic regression showed that self-reported
news exposure on the day of 9/11 was a marginal predictor
of Persistent False Memory (Wald = 3.34, p = .068). Simi-
larly, a bivariate logistic regression revealed that news expo-
sure in the month after 9/11 was a predictor of Persistent
False Memory (Wald = 4.89, p = .027). However, putting
both these media exposure variables into the same model
resulted in neither being significant predictors of Persistent
False Memory (ps > .316), which may be explained by the
high inter-correlation between the two media variables (r =
.562, p < .001) although the variance inflation factor was
not excessive (VIF = 1.67).
Individual differences as correlates of Persistent False
Memory
We use Persistent False Memory as the main outcome vari-
able in most of the analyses that follow because we consider
it the cleanest and most conservative measure of a real visual
false memory. If participants indicated a false memory in the
questionnaire but not the interview, it is possible that they
did not actually visualize a false memory, perhaps misunder-
standing the question. There is also some doubt cast on inter-
view false memories if the participant had previously
indicated that they had not seen the footage in the question-
naire. Only two participants in the experimental group gave a
false memory in the interview after not indicating a false
memory in the questionnaire.3 Therefore, Persistent False
Memory is only a slightly more conservative measure than
Interview False Memory (12.4% vs. 13.4% in experimental
group). In addition, using Persistent False Memory elimi-
nates the possible confound of some participants having
prior suggestion and some not: all participants received prior
suggestion. For these reasons, and in order to reduce the ef-
fects of multiple comparisons that would occur if we used
several outcome measures, we chose Persistent False Mem-
ory as the best outcome measure for exploring most individ-
ual differences measures.
Demographics
There was no association between those who had a Persistent
False Memory and gender, age, or whether the participant
was a psychology major or not (ps > .332). Specifically on
gender, a variable discussed in previous research, females
had statistically similar Persistent False Memory rates
(12.5%) to males (12.0%), χ2 (1, N = 202) = 0.009, p = .926
(exact p = 1.000), Cramer’s V = 0.007.
Those identifying their ethnicity as Middle Eastern had
significantly higher rates of Persistent False Memory
3 Because n = 2, we refrain from analyzing and discussing these individuals
in depth in the article. We might speculate that in these individuals the initial
suggestion had a delayed effect, although further research is required to es-
tablish this.
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(46.7%) compared with those of other ethnicities (9.6%), χ2
(1, N = 202) = 17.57, exact p = .001, Cramer’s V = 0.295.
This association between Middle Eastern ethnicity and
Persistent False Memory was not affected by familiarity with
the United 93 and was only slightly partially mediated by
high-arousal negative emotion in the week following 9/11
(before mediation: β = 2.11, p < .001; after mediation: β =
1.97, p = .001).
Reported emotion in week after 9/11
Those who demonstrated a Persistent False Memory re-
ported higher ratings of how often they had felt high-arousal
negative emotions in week after following 9/11 (M = 4.12,
SD = 2.78), compared with those not exhibiting a Persistent
False Memory (M = 3.14, SD = 2.12), t(197) = 1.66, p =
.040, Cohen’s d = 0.40. This report of their emotions in the
week after occurred approximately 10years after 9/11. This dif-
ference was less pronounced in negative emotions not catego-
rized as high arousal (ps > .133).
Alcohol use
Those who demonstrated a Persistent False Memory re-
ported higher frequency of consuming alcohol than did those
who did not show a Persistent False Memory (M = 2.80: just
below the anchor twice a month, SD = 0.53), compared with
those not exhibiting a Persistent False Memory (M = 2.14,
just above the anchor once a month, SD = 1.39), t(200) =
2.20, p = .029, Cohen’s d = 0.45. This Likert scale was a
fully anchored scale from 1 = never to 9 = everyday (from
LaBrie, Hummer, Grant, & Luc, 2010). Similarly, those with
a Persistent False Memory reported more heavy alcohol
drinking binges (defined as 4/5 drinks in a 2-hour period)
in the last 2months (M = 2.76, SD = 2.05) compared with
those who did not show a Persistent False Memory (M =
1.94, SD = 1.59), t(200) = 2.33, p = .021, Cohen’s d =
0.45. This Likert scale ranged from 1 = none, to 9 = 10 or
more times. A summed composite of these and two other al-
cohol use questions also revealed a statistically significant
difference, t(200) = 2.01, p = .046, Cohen’s d = 0.28.
Fantasy proneness and dissociation
Those with a Persistent False Memory were significantly
higher on fantasy proneness (M = 11.48, SD = 4.25; Creative
Experiences Questionnaire) compared with those with no
Persistent False Memory (M = 9.22, SD = 4.15), t(200) =
2.54, p = .012, Cohen’s d = 0.54. There were no differences
between those with Persistent False Memory and those with-
out on dissociation (p = .953; DES-C).
Personality
We found no association between Persistent False Memory
and participants’ personality trait subscales (Swedish Uni-
versities Scale of Personality; see section on Method): social
desirability, somatic trait anxiety, psychic trait anxiety, stress
susceptibility, lack of assertiveness, impulsiveness, adven-
ture seeking, detachment, embitterment, trait irritability, mis-
trust, verbal trait aggression, and physical trait aggression
(all ps > .201). As described in the Supporting Information
we found no associations between the personality of the
interviewer and false memory rates in the interview; with
gender, age, and socio-economic status of the interviewer
also yielding no effect (cf. Porter, Birt, Yuille, &Lehman, 2000).
Examining those ages 8–12 years at the time of the target
event (9/11)
We replicated the aforementioned analysis excluding parti-
cipants from age 23 to 51 years (n = 26) because the majority
of our participants were between 18 and 22 years (n = 271),
and, here, we wanted to focus on participants between the
ages of 18 and 22 years who were in mid-childhood (ages
8 to 12 years) when the target events of 9/11 occurred.
Almost all the comparisons had similar outcomes as with
the full sample. In other words, in those who were between
8 and 12 years old at the time of the target event (9/11), we
found similar percentages of false memories as with the full
sample. We also confirmed that relationships between fami-
liarity, ethnicity, alcohol use, fantasy proneness, and false
memories existed in this 18- to 22-year-old subgroup, as well
as the full sample. However, in the 18- to 22-year-old
subgroup, we found all subtypes of memory for negative
emotions in the week following 9/11 predicted false memo-
ries generally, whereas in the full sample, high-arousal
emotions were a stronger predictor than other types of
emotion (see Supporting Information for full analysis).
Figure 3 shows the percentages of Persistent False Memory
by age category at the time of the event. A chi-squared analysis
comparing Persistent False Memory rates of those who were
12years or younger (13.1%; consolidating first five age
categories in Figure 1) to those 13years or older at the time
of the event (5.3%) revealed no significant difference, χ2 (1,
N = 202) = 0.98, p = .323, Cramer’s V = 0.070. A chi-squared
analysis on all the six categorized age groups revealed no main
effect for age group, χ2 (5,N = 202) = 4.83, p = .437, Cramer’s
V = 0.155. This result was similarly not statistically significant
when excluding those age 23years or above, χ2 (4, N = 183) =
3.66, p = .454, Cramer’s V = 0.141. Similarly, age analyzed as
a continuous variable was not reliably associated with
Persistent False Memory (full age range: rbp = 0.069,
Figure 3. Percentage of participants in each age category who
demonstrated a Persistent False Memory in the study. To convert
the x-axis to the age of the participants at the time of the study, add
10 years
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p = .332; limited 8–12years age range at time of 9/11:
rbp = 0.017, p = .819).
Qualitative analysis of interview false memories
In the Supporting Information, we document some of the
wording used by participants in the interview who demon-
strated an Interview False Memory. In those two examples,
it is clear that the participants understood which crash the in-
terviewer was referring to. The United 93 crash was clearly
distinguished from the other 9/11 crashes at the beginning
of the interview (see the full interview script in the
Supporting Information). In both interview excerpts, the
emerging false memory seems relatively fragile at this stage,
and although some false details are emerging (e.g., ‘burst
into flames when it crashed into the floor’), it is also clear
that these details are not yet filled out into a vivid and heavily
detailed memory. This pattern was observed in many of the
interview transcripts that demonstrated a false memory. It
is because of this qualitative examination of the words used
by participants in the interview that we conclude that the
false memories are still in the fragile early stages of forma-
tion and not yet fully developed into multi-detailed and vivid
autobiographical memory.
DISCUSSION
The study produced false memory reports of seeing the non-
existent footage of the United 93 crash in a sizable minority
of subjects in both in the computer questionnaire and in our
more rigorous follow-up interview. This interview involved
free recall (as opposed to forced-choice in the questionnaire),
and we asked follow-up questions to help us distinguish
between a false memory and a false belief. We were conser-
vative in that we required three prerequisite necessary condi-
tions (a ‘yes’, a score not including 1 = no memory at all on a
1–10 scale, and a false detail of the actual crash) when
distinguishing a false memory from a false belief in both
the questionnaire and the interview. Even with the necessary
condition of a false detail accompanying the false report, we
still found 12.4% had a Persistent False Memory throughout
the questionnaire and the interview. Of those familiar with
the United 93 news story, 17.6% had a Persistent False
Memory, with media exposure marginally associating with
such false memories. Prior suggestion 40minutes earlier in
the questionnaire had an additive effect on false memory
rates in the interview, with approximately a fourfold differ-
ence in percentages. Middle Eastern participants had higher
rates of Persistent False Memory than people of other ethnic-
ities. High-arousal negative emotion, alcohol use, and
fantasy proneness were associated with higher Persistent
False Memory.
Despite many previous studies showing co-occurrence of
a memory report and a false detail, some uncertainty about
the paradigm was introduced by Smeets et al. (2009). That
study raised the question of whether the crashing memory
paradigm was actually producing false memories, as
opposed to mistaken beliefs or other types of errors. In
Smeets et al. (2009), they found that after participants were
told there was actually no footage, 80% of those who had
previous indicated a false memory retracted, many claiming
that they had misunderstood the question. After debriefing,
only 10% of the total sample in Smeets et al. (2009) indi-
cated that they had had a false memory, compared with
66% before debriefing. In our current study, we also encoun-
tered a drop in the number of false memories when we
explicitly clarified the events and the question in our face-
to-face interview (from 33% to 13% within the experimental
group). Our study shows that this reduction in false memory
rates can be achieved before debriefing, which is to say that
the reduction in our study was not caused by the post-event
true information (as could have been a partial cause of the
reduction in Smeets et al., 2009). The reduction in false
memory rates in the current study is perhaps because the
interview was clearer, more cautious, and more detailed
compared with the briefer questionnaire. One could also
speculate that the face-to-face nature of the interview in our
study elicited more caution and attention in the participants,
compared with the anonymous clicking of the mouse on the
computer questionnaire (cf. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996).
From this, we concur with Smeets et al. (2009) that even
though there is a reduction of false memory rates, there is
still a minority of people who exhibit what appears to be a
genuine false memory. It is clear from both these studies that
a good proportion of the emerging false memories are ini-
tially fragile and labile, because many initial false reports
are corrected in the presence of true post-event information
or more cautious questioning. However, it is possible that
even some of these labile false reports would consolidate
into full and stable false memories in the presence of rein-
forcement and time and in the absence of debriefing or cau-
tion. Indeed, in the present study, we show that two expo-
sures to misleading information led to higher false memory
rates than just one.
On a related note, Ost et al. (2008) and Smeets et al.
(2009) raised the question whether false memories observed
in crashing memory studies were already formed prior to
suggestion (spontaneous) or caused by the suggestion in
the experiment itself. Our use of random assignment during
the questionnaire phase into groups that either received sug-
gestion or no suggestion allowed us to conclude that sugges-
tion in the experimental condition is an important cause of
the false memories. This is evidence that perhaps a good pro-
portion of false memory reports in crashing memory studies
are in fact suggestion-dependent rather than spontaneous.
Qualitative evidence for this fragility of these newly
formed false memories is perhaps gained from examining
the actual wording used by the participants in the interview.
It appears that even in those demonstrating false memories,
those false memories are newly formed with only a few
details. They appear relatively labile, and this fragility may
explain why previous research found that many false reports
were retracted after correcting post-event information
(Smeets et al., 2009) and why our percentages dropped from
the questionnaire to the interview. It is for these reasons that
we suspect that repeated reinforcement and time would be
needed to solidify the false memories into elaborate and
highly detailed accounts. This is supported by our finding
that prior suggestion seemed to also lead to clearer false
memories, compared with those with no prior suggestion.
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In addition, past research into implanting childhood false
memories has shown that repetition (e.g., Ceci, Huffman,
Smith, & Loftus, 1994a) and repetition combined with sug-
gestion (e.g., Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994b)
might be important for producing elaborate false memories
that become richer in detail and more resistant to correction,
compared with the early stages of false memory formation.
As in previous crashing memory studies (Ost et al., 2008),
we found that fantasy proneness was associated with false
memory. This can be explained by the ability of fantasy
prone individuals to visualize and imagine events and a
tendency to remember a lot of visual details from the past
(both accurately and inaccurately, see Merckelbach, 2004;
cf. Patihis et al., 2013). This capacity likely helps bring the
event to mind in a visual form, which in turn leads to the
later consolidation of a full false memory. However, unlike
Ost et al. (2008), we did not find that dissociation was asso-
ciated with false memory production. Other personality traits
also did not associate with false memories in the current
study. In particular, it is interesting that those who were high
on social desirability had similar rates of false memory as
those low on social desirability. This tends to dampen the
idea that participants may be demonstrating false memories
out of a wish to be socially accepted by the researchers.
Interestingly, we found that participants identifying as
Middle Eastern had higher false memory rates, compared
with other ethnicities. It is unclear why this might be. One
possibility was that because of the political connection of
the terrorist attacks on 9/11 to the Middle East, those identi-
fying as Middle Eastern might be more familiar with the
news story. This, however, is probably not the case because
those identifying as Middle Eastern had similar familiarity
with the United 93 news event as other participants. Another
possibility is that they had more negative emotions during
and following 9/11: but this idea had only marginal support:
memory of negative emotion only partially explained the
relationship in a mediation analysis. For these reasons,
although this result seems intuitively to make sense, it is
difficult to say for certain the reason for the relationship
between ethnicity and false memory for 9/11. In addition,
caution is warranted here because only a small sample of
22 identified as Middle Eastern.
Interestingly, those who reported remembering more fre-
quent experience of high-arousal negative emotions in the
week following 11 September 2001, had a higher proportion
of false memories for the United 93 crash footage. This may
be an indication that high emotional arousal may not only aid
in memory consolidation (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998) but
paradoxically can lead to errors in details, in particular a
higher susceptibility to false memories for some details (cf.
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; also see the Paradoxical Nega-
tive Emotion hypothesis, Porter, Taylor, & ten Brinke, 2008).
There are some limitations to this study. Our measure for
how often participants felt negative emotions in the week
after 9/11 would not be as accurate as if we had asked them
soon after the event. This possible inaccuracy in this variable
may come from the passage of time, or changing of how they
appraise the events of 9/11 (cf. Levine, Whalen, Henker, &
Jamner, 2005). One method for addressing this issue would
be to conduct a longitudinal design, and future research
could attempt that. In addition, this study is different than
many previous studies in that a sizable minority of partici-
pants was not familiar with the specific United 93 news
story. Nevertheless, this allowed us to confirm that familiar-
ity was indeed related to false memory rates.
This current study contributes to our current knowledge of
false memory and crashing memory research in a number of
ways. Firstly, it shows that reductions in false memory rates
can be found by being more cautious and detailed in the way
you ask the crashing memory questions, even after mislead-
ing suggestion has been presented. The current study estab-
lishes such a reduction in rates before debriefing, whereas
Smeets et al. (2009) did so after also telling the participants
that no footage actually exists. It also demonstrates that not
all false memories in the crashing memory paradigm are so
fragile that they either disappear with cautious further probing,
or turn out to be a mere belief. We establish here that a mino-
rity are persistent and genuine detailed false memories. We
argue that in the absence of debriefing that these semi-
autobiographical false memories could persist, especially if
reinforced. We show that repeated suggestion increased false
memory rates in the crashingmemory paradigm.We also iden-
tify factors that might increase these types of autobiographical
memories, such as high-arousal emotions, alcohol use, prior
suggestion, and familiarity. We also present some evidence
that is congruent with previous findings showing a link
between fantasy proneness and false memories. This study,
and the crashing memory paradigm as a whole, gives memory
researchers the opportunity to measure memory distortion in
the autobiographical domain with the rare knowledge that we
are sure the original event did not take place. News events such
as 9/11 are important because they represent memories that
can subjectively be experienced as flashbulb-like. Such collec-
tive experience represents the part of our autobiographical
memory that is shared with millions of others. As Neisser
(1982, p. 48) wrote, these are events in which we ‘line up
our own lives with the course of history itself and say “I was
there” ’. It could be considered rather Orwellian that these
news memories are malleable.
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